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Lothar Brock and Hendrik Simon’s edited book on The Justification of War and
International Order (2021) is a rich volume that brings together scholars from across
international law, political theory, history, and international relations. The book’s
central tenet is that, unlike what realists of all stripes would supposedly claim, the
way in which states and other political actors justify going to war matters. More
specifically, the editors seek to demonstrate the “discursive co-constitutionalization
of the justification of war and international order” (p. 4).
This is quite a mouthful, and “co-constitution,” rather than co-constitutionalization, is
perhaps the more common term here. But what they mean, essentially, is that the
behavior of international actors is shaped by the norms of the international order and
vice versa.
This volume is ambitious in many respects. Instead of focusing on “war” as limited
to inter-state conflict, it considers justifications for the use of force ranging from
“measures short of war” and “imperial policing” to “coercion” and “humanitarian
intervention”. Rather than confining itself to justifications in continental Europe or
in the “West” more broadly, it includes both considerations about imperial contexts
and a separate part on “non-Western” justifications of war. Instead of exclusively
examining theoretical discourses about the justification of war, it includes detailed
analyses of how war was justified in political practice. Although the editors could
have made more of these innovative foci—a point to which I will return—their
choices still make for an insightful collection that will undoubtedly prove a useful
resource for those working on the relationship between war and international order.
Against Realism? Norms, International Order, And The Shadow of Carl Schmitt
Pulling together various elements from the twenty-six individual contributions—an
impressive collection indeed—the editors leave us with two main takeaway points.
The first and most obvious is that realists are wrong in dismissing justifications for
war as empty propaganda with no actual traction on international relations. The
editors claim—though I disagree—that this is the single most powerful contribution of
the book: “our fundamental thesis is that in their justifications of war, states and other
political actors refer to (existing or presumed) norms of the international order to
depict their own violence as legitimate, that is ‘appropriate behaviour.’ […] As norms
of the international order shape the justification practices of states, the practice
of justification in specific cases shapes the general normative order.” (p. 4) Put
simply, norms matter. I will come back to this below.
The second, and to my mind, much more intriguing claim, is that justifications for war
have always been considered necessary, even during the periods often assumed
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to have dispensed with the convention. The volume powerfully undermines the
widespread narrative according to which “early modernity witnessed a transformation
of the discourse on war and international law which was consolidated in the
nineteenth century and which allowed states to wage war without reference to any
normative justifications” (p. 505).
As the editors note in their introduction, this narrative is of course directly inherited
from Carl Schmitt, who refers to this transformation as the emergence of a “non-
discriminatory concept of war” (nicht-diskriminierender Kriegsbegriff). Within this
conceptualization of war’s role in the international order, what mattered was no
longer whether a belligerent had a just cause (the “discriminatory concept of war”)
but whether it had the right authority, i.e. (according to Schmitt) whether or not it
was a sovereign state. In Schmitt’s narrative, this concept first emerges in Alberico
Gentili’s famous 1598 treatise on the laws of war and, at a stroke, transforms
medieval international law into its modern incarnation. In Schmitt’s own words
in The Nomos of the Earth (1950, English translation 2003), “[i]t was Gentili who
succeeded in creating a new concept of war based on the sovereign state.” For
Schmitt, then, the period from roughly 1648 to 1914 was a golden era of restrained
warfare (“war in form”), during which justifications for going to war (a “just cause”) no
longer mattered. All that was required for war to be legitimate was for the actor using
force to be a sovereign state, and sovereign states at war would treat each other
respectfully, as equal peers with a disagreement rather than as judges punishing
evildoers. Schmitt considers that this quintessentially “modern” understanding of
war was severely undermined in the twentieth century by an Anglo-American liberal
crusade that brought back a moralistic slant to warfare and revived the unchained
violence of the medieval “just war” approach.
There is much to say about the many ways in which Schmitt’s enormously influential
narrative is historically erroneous, and this volume contributes an important element
to its takedown. In view of the fascinating contribution of AnuschkaTischer on the
early modern period, together with those of Hendrik Simon, Lauren Benton, and
Isabel Hull on the nineteenth century, the assumption that, starting in the early
modern period, politicians stopped needing to justify their decision to use force
and that this necessity has only returned in the twentieth century becomes entirely
untenable.
Much is at stake in overturning this conventional narrative, and I am predisposed to
be highly sympathetic to the endeavor. If anything, though, the editors undersell its
importance.
An Odd Choice of Interlocutors?
Part of the problem, I believe, is that while the editors do bring some scholars of the
history of international relations into the conversation, both in their references and
as contributors to the volume, this engagement remains quite thin, in spite of the
significant overlap between what the volume is trying to achieve and what a large
group of scholars working on the history of the international order seek to do as well.
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First, the editors tell us that the aim of the book is “to highlight the fragility and the
persistence of shared normative orientations in the struggle for international
order” (p. 17). Amongst scholars interested in international order, this is hardly a
disputed claim. There is no doubt that framing the volume’s overarching historical
narrative as a pushback against Schmitt’s realist account is a powerful move. But
the power of the move does not come from its debunking ofsome realist idea that
norms do not matter in international politics. It comes from the book’s highlighting
of the profound flaws of Schmitt’s historical account. Schmitt’s story of an epochal
shift from a hyper-violent medieval international order to a more peaceful modern
one based on a new concept of war remains remarkably mainstream, and as such,
exposing its incoherencies can help move the conversation forward a great deal.
By contrast, the argument against realism as such is not particularly innovative. The
idea that norms matter in international politics, and that both realists and rationalist-
institutionalists—the other theoretical approach mentioned in the introduction (p.
5)—do not have the analytical tools to grapple with the significance of norms,
was the starting point of constructivism in the 1990s. As early as 1997, scholars
could claim in leading IR journals that “the once controversial statement that
norms matter is accepted by the most diehard neorealists.” Whether or not every
single realist scholar would agree with this statement, the importance of norms
has been acknowledged across most of the literature for more than twenty years
now, including in the realm of war (see for instance the classic works of Richard
Price and Nina Tannenwald, which go surprisingly unmentioned here). While the
editors do mention constructivism, this is only in theirconcluding chapter, in what
reads like a slightly puzzling “aha!” moment (p. 504). Yet, not only is the realist/
constructivist disagreement on the analytical relevance of norms a bit of a dated
trope, there is now a much wider and much more detailed historical literature on
the role of various norms in the evolution of the international order that would have
seemed to provide the editors with several compelling candidates for engagement.
More interestingly, the editors suggest that this book’s genealogical approach raises
questions about historical change and continuity, and notably—with a critical eye
on Hathaway and Shapiro’s The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw
War Remade the World —about the shift from an “old” to a “new” international order
(p. 17). Specifically, the editors ask two broad questions. First, can we identify any
major breaks, any critical junctures in the practice of justifying the use of force,
on the basis of which one could speak of a significant change in the nature of the
international order? Or are we continuously asking the same questions, riding—in
the editors’ words—“a merry-go-around of history where reiteration clearly outruns
innovation?” (p. 24). Second, and relatedly, how can we understand the current
trajectory of the international order? Where are we going?
On both counts, these are the quintessential questions asked by scholars working on
the history of the international order, whether they are most indebted to—amongst
others—intellectual history, conceptual history, or international historical sociology.
These were also the central questions asked by IR’s English School over 50 years
ago. In fact, the editors cite Hedley Bull at the very start of their introduction in
support of a claim that is remarkably similar to their central argument: “discourses
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on the use of force construct ‘international order’ as a normative frame of reference
for politics and theory alike” (p. 4). Why not use this as a starting point, then, and
connect this specific project on justifications for war and international order more
explicitly to the sizable literature on the historical trajectory of the international order
that has developed across various academic fields since the early 2000s?
The concluding chapter is a courageous attempt to synthesize all twenty-six
contributions into a single, lengthy, and complex meta-account of the justification
of war as it relates to the formation of international order, but despite its impressive
span, one is left with the sense of a jigsaw puzzle with half of the pieces left
out. How does this idiosyncratic account relate to other recent narratives about
the changing character of war or—even more directly—the relationship between war
and international order? More broadly, it is clear that the regulation of violence in the
international system forms one of the key pillars of any international order, but it is
not the only one. How, then, does it relate to the others? For instance, how does this
narrative stand vis-à-vis works on the changing character of diplomacy, on shifting
conceptions of territoriality, or on the evolution of the great power system?
There are, of course, limits to what an edited volume can cover. But had the editors
connected their project more actively to the vibrant debates happening around the
changing nature of the international order over time, their account could have landed
further away from the crumbling orthodoxies they are seeking to challenge. Yes, it
successfully undermines part of Schmitt’s narrative, and that is already a significant
contribution. However, it still tells a story that unfolds primarily from the nineteenth
century onward, primarily between states, and primarily from the point of view of
Europe and the “West.”
“Non-Western Perspectives” As An Afterthought?
The global early modern world is currently the crux of countless debates about
how to evaluate more accurately the changing shape of the international order. Yet
only four of the volume’s twenty-six contributions pertain to the world before 1800.
Geographically, although some discrete chapters touch on the world of European
empires and thus on colonial encounters beyond the confines of the geographical
West, much of the more globally-oriented material in the volume is in a separate
Part VI on “non-Western perspectives” whose three chapters feel more like an
afterthought than an integral part of the editors’ project. There is potentially a whole
different history to be written here, one in which the global early modern world plays
a much larger role and in which many of the actors justifying their use of force were
neither states nor Europeans.
Perhaps the one-sidedness of the examination here comes from the loose use
of “international order” throughout the book’s framing. Is this “international order”
meant as a synonym for international stability, is it, much more broadly the(global)
international order, or is it an implicitly European “international order” that co-existed
with other regional international orders and eventually expanded to the rest of the
world, à la Bull & Watson? The editors briefly note that there is no commonly shared
definition of “international order” (p. 13), but that does not tell us much about where
they are coming from analytically.
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Finally, in a work about the relationship between justifications for war and
international order, it is a bit surprising not to see any engagement with the
recent literature on the debates surrounding the 1977 Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions, where the question of the legitimate use of force and the
explicit language of “just war” came very much front and center in the context of
national liberal movements, as Jessica Whyte’s widely discussed work has recently
shown. Third World activism at the United Nations in the 1970s was a particularly
ambitious attempt to reset the rules of the global international order, and between
decolonization and the proposal for a New International Economic Order, it is no
surprise that the Third World coalition also sought to reform the discourse around
the legitimate use of force. Since the current volume proposes various reflections on
international law’s relationship to empire, it would have been beneficial to engage
with this historic moment in the regulation of warfare, when a progressive vision
anchored in the realities of decolonization emerged as a challenge to the legal norms
of the colonial past.
That said, this book remains an important step away from stale Schmittian accounts
of the relationship between war and international order, and thus a valuable resource
for all those working on the topic. If anything, there simply remains much more to be
explored.
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